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I In the context of political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the durability of socialism in China is in some ways 
surprising. By the late 1980s it might have appeared that socialism 
was under greater threat in China than in Europe. Economic 
reforms had provided grounds for scepticism concerning the 
commitment to socialism among the Chinese leadership, with the 
remarkable encouragement of practices which would have been 
unimagmable a very few years before. There was also ample 
evidence of considerable popular cynicism, and even official sources 
had admitted to a "crisis of faith", which was reflected in dissenting 
political behaviour and occasional direct challenges to the regme. 
Whether by revolution or peaceful evolution, by mid-1989 the 
demise of socialism in China seemed likely. 
There are, of course, many possible explanations of why that 
apparent likelihood has not (yet) been realized - the regime's 
indigenous rather than imposed origins, willingness to resort to 
coercion, cultural resistance to political disorder, and so on. My 
focus in this paper, however, is not on those explanations but on an 
underlying issue confronting discussions of the demise of socialism. 
That is the interpretation of socialism itself, and specifically the 
implications of the official Chinese interpretation. Here again an 
immediate comparison with other experiences suggests itself. 
European comrades had grounds for being more confident in their 
appeals to socialism, since they had generally been much more 
consistent in interpretation and assertion of the values of socialism. 
In the Soviet Union, for example, "developed socialism" was 
presented as a new concept in the late 1960s; but did not suggest 
a radical break in the understanding of the basic character of the 
Soviet system. There may then have followed different emphases in 
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invocation of "developed socialism", corresponding to the changes 
in the claimed benefits of the ~ys tem.~  Nevertheless, there was a 
generally-accepted orthodoxy concerning the character of socialism, 
derived from the notion of a socialist system articulated by Stalin in 
1936; which persisted over a long period, with changes appearing 
as adaptations according to a gradually developing environment. 
Such consistency has not applied in the Chinese case. While the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has, to a large extent, adopted an 
approach similar to that of the European parties, it has also flirted 
with significant departures in its interpretation of socialism, 
especially under Mao Zedong's interventions. The official for- 
mulations of recent years have to be seen against that background 
of mutability. 
Socialism under Mao 
Until the mid-1950s the CCP accepted the straightforward concep- 
tion of socialism which it inherited directly from the Soviet Union. 
The process of "socialist transformation" involved emulation of the 
socialist system, as already established in the Soviet Union, ahd, 
following Stalin, defined primarily according to replacement of 
private ownership of the means of production by collective aktd 
state ownership. Other characteristics of the socialist system were 
also to be adopted - including, most impoi-tantly, "Party leadership", 
which underlay the CCP's penetration of other organizations and its 
centrality to all political processes. There were disagreements within 
the Party over the policies appropriate for socialist transformation, 
but these were within the general framework of agreed understan- 
ding of socialism as a clearly-defined model. That agreed understan- 
ding was, however, to be eroded in two stages. First, during the 
second half of the 1950s some parts of the Party began to assert 
greater flexibility in interpretation of "socialist system". And then, 
by the 1960s there emerged views which challenged the very notion 
of a socialist ~ys tem.~ 
New formulations during the second half of the 1950s did not 
imply a fundamental rejection of the former understanding of 
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socialism, as the conception of a "socialist system" remained. But 
that system was now to be understood as a more generalized, looser 
model, in contrast to the specific and restrictive model which had 
applied when looking to the Soviet Union. Hence, socialism could 
still be identified in terms of general characteristics, such as the 
forms of ownership, but the concept could be severed from 
particular practices in other countries recognized as "socialist". 
Accordingly, CCP sources began to suggest means of socialist 
transformation which departed from Soviet precedent. The most 
important area of novelty was in the notion of progress and 
development, as Soviet-style reliance on centralized planning and 
incremental change was challenged by arguments emphasizing the 
fluidity of social forces, so that socialism would advance dramatical- 
ly by "leaps" and the creativity generated through "contradictions 
among the people". This approach could strike powerful chords in 
the CCP, evoking themes of heroic mass endeavour and sacrifice for 
common benefit which were well-entrenched Party myths (whether 
or not they were valid understandings of the anti-Japanese and 
Liberation struggles). The looser notion of socialism also cor- 
responded to pressures within the CCP for more innovative policies, 
better suited to Chinese circumstances and overcoming some of the 
perceived deficiencies of a foreign model. Although not so labelled, 
this process might be seen as the "Sinification of socialism" com- 
parable to the "Sinification of Marxism" of the early 1940s. It was 
thus a precursor of the notion of "socialism with Chinese charac- 
teristics" to emerge some three decades later. 
A far bleaker vision of socialist prospects prevailed in the 1960s, 
eventually to be termed the "theory of continuous revolution". The 
key themes became the persistence of "class struggle" throughout 
the process of socialist transition and the dangers of revolutionary 
retrogression or "restoration of capitalism". This "theory" was 
certainly not presented coherently. It was never clear whether "class 
struggle" was a vestige of pre-1949 society, or a product of privilege 
and power in the new society, or constantly generated from a 
material basis in the persistence of capitalist relations of production 
within "socialism". The conception of socialism was a major casualty 
of such confusion. Although Cultural Revolution discussions still 
usually assumed positive identification of China as socialist, there 
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was also a persistent underlying theme which cast doubt on the 
notion of a socialist system. This went beyond the expressed fears 
that socialism was endangered because of the machination of class 
enemies. There were also suggestions that a system such as China's 
could not be identified as "socialist" in a straightforward manner, 
because it contained contradictory elements which formed a basis 
for retrogression. To take the most important example, the under- 
standing of socialism in terms of forms of ownership usually 
persisted. But there were also claims that, within state or collective 
ownership, relations characteristic of the capitalist mode of produc- 
tion continued. The simple identification of a socialist system was 
thus implicitly undermined, even if still explicitly affirmed. A 
similar contradiction applied to another principal characteristic of 
a socialist system, the operation of "Party leadership". The various 
different analyses all pointed to the Communist Party itself as the 
main arena of class struggle and, hence, as posing the main danger 
of revolutionary reversal. This suggested that "Party leadership" 
could no longer be understood simply as a necessary and unchallen- 
geable characteristic of the "socialist system". And so the Cultural 
Revolution confused the understanding of socialism. While 
socialism was still usually understood as a model positively 
identified with the Chinese system, as it had been in earlier periods, 
there were also contradictory tendencies which implicitly denied 
that identification, 
Post-Mao Socialism 
Within a few years after 1976 the post-Mao leadership moved to 
counter the ideological confusion associated with the "theory of 
continuous revolution". In 1978 the Central Committee rejected the 
supposed pervasiveness and centrality of class struggle in socialist 
society, and by 1981 the "theory" itself was directly repudiated. That 
cleared the ground for a replacement formulation of the official 
conception of socialism. The phrase "socialism with Chinese 
characteristics" was selected as an affirmation that China does have 
a socialist system, without any of the ambiguities raised during the 
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I Cultural Revolution. The reference to "Chinese" is, of course, partly 
1 a nationalist appeal, but also provides for flexibility in the interpre- 
1 
I 
I tation of socialism. As in the latter half of the 1950s, the socialist 
I system is presented as a rather loose model, including some general 
I characteristics and allowing wide scope for adaptations which are 
I justified as meeting particular Chinese circumstances. Official 
I sources recognize this parallel, pointing to the efforts to move away 
I from Soviet-style socialism after 1956. But while Mao and other 
I Party leaders became aware of the need to adapt to Chinese 
1 conditions, they failed to develop the type of systematic understan- 
ding of socialism that they had achieved in the earlier stage of 
"democratic revolution". Deng Xiaoping is said to have been able to 
build upon the earlier experiences of innovation in socialist 
construction while transcending their limitations of understanding. 
Hence, "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is presented as 
continuous with earlier Party efforts but also as a new scientific 
concept which is Deng's personal ~reation.~ 
There have been two main trends in the progressive development 
of this formulation since the late 1970s. The first is that socialism 
has been interpreted in economistic terms. Reference to "Chinese 
characteristics" has been used largely in support of programmes of 
economic reform, to the extent that "socialism" has been subsumed 
within standards of economic development understood as growth 
of production. That has contributed greatly to the other trend, 
which has been that even the looser understanding of defining 
characteristics of the socialist system has been challenged by recent 
practices sanctioned or encouraged by the CCP. But a key excep- 
tion has been that aspects of present political arrangements are 
asserted as necessary parts of the "socialist political system". Hence, 
while these two trends are mutually reinforcing, and together have 
reduced the substantial content of "socialism" in China, they are also 
in some ways contradictory - with the contradiction focussed on 
implications for the political role of the CCP. 
The trend towards the economistic interpretation of socialism has 
been evident throughout the reform period. In early 1979, im- 
mediately after the Third Plenum and the "shift in focus" to 
modernization, there was a decided tendency to reduce all aspects 
of social policy to economic productivity. This was later qualified, 
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by greater emphasis on "socialist modernisation", the need for 
"socialist spiritual civilisation", and so on. Nevertheless, the 
economistic reduction of socialism persisted, and was again 
reinforced at the CCP 13th National Congress in 1987 by the so- 
called "theory of the initial stage of socialism" presented by Zhao 
ziyang6 
The "theory" proceeded from the assertion that China has a 
socialist system. But that system is in an "initial stage", which is "the 
specific stage China must necessarily go through in building 
socialism under conditions of backward productive forces and an 
undeveloped commodity economy." While some limited class 
struggle remains, the "principal contradiction" becomes that 
"between the people's daily increasing material and cultural needs 
and backward social production." Resolution of that contradiction 
requires expansion of the commodity economy, higher labour 
productivity, modernization, and reforming "parts of the relations 
of production and of the superstructure which are unsuitable for 
development of the productive  force^,"^ The "initial stage" will end 
when present backwardness is overcome. Hence, the whole 
character of "socialism" in China is understood in terms of levels of 
economic development. 
The main use of this "theory" is obviously justification or ratio- 
nalization of economic policies and practices which are seen as 
desirable for increasing productivity. Whatever facilitates growth of 
the "productive forces" can be presented as consistent with resolu- 
tion of the current principal contradiction. Perhaps the best example 
is justification of growing inequalities, on the grounds of stimulation 
of growth. The Party's new orthodoxy effectively denies the 
application of standards derived from what have usually been seen 
as "socialist" goals or values. Not only can these be dismissed as not 
bearing upon the "principal contradiction", but contrary practices 
can be regarded as valuable or legitimate because they are consis- 
tent with the requirements of the "initial stage". The most general 
statement of such flexibility is that "relations of production and the 
superstructure" must be changed in order to become consistent with 
economic growth. That bears some similarity to the notion of 
"cultural lag" of Cultural Revolution vintage, which saw the need 
to eradicate the "bourgeois superstructure" continuing to impede 
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and threaten the "socialist economic base". The main difference now, 
though, is that the impediments are often what formerly would 
have been regarded as "socialist" standards, while the "economic 
base" is seen narrowly in terms of economic results. 
In other words, the formulation of the characteristics of the "initial 
stage" tends to render vacuous parts of the assertion that China has 
already established a socialist system. That system is defined 
officially in terms of an economic structure based on public 
ownership of the means of production, a political structure of 
"people's democratic dictatorship", and the affirmation of Marxist- 
Leninist ideological guidance. But the "initial stage" conception of 
socialism suggests that the economic structure dimension of the 
system should be adaptable according to requirements of economic 
growth. And that process has been evident throughout the reform 
period. There may be those within the CCP who continue to insist 
on principles such as the priority of "public ownership" and a 
prominent role for planning. But they have rather little basis for that 
position according to the Party's own interpretation of socialism. 
The ideologcal dimension of the system is also very fragile. That 
is most evident in much intellectual discourse, in which Marxism- 
Leninism is treated as irrelevant and has been displaced by a range 
of competing ideologcal orientations. More broadly, the former 
dominance of official ideological positions has greatly declined since 
the late 1970s. Although the CCP has waged periodical ideological 
campaigns and attempted to reinforce mechanisms of indoctrination, 
those efforts have confronted the proliferation of sources of 
information available to most of the Chinese people, the availability 
of competing views, and the widespread cynicism generated by the 
gap between official pronouncements and practice. Such tendencies 
are again reinforced by the CCP's interpretation of socialism. The 
priority accorded to economic growth overwhelms assertions of the 
desirabilty of "socialist spiritual civilisation". An insistence on 
superstructural changes compatible with the growth of productive 
forces justifies modifying or abandoning inconvenient aspects of 
Marxist-Leninist "guidance". The result has been inconsistency in the 
official position, especially when people are encouraged to maintain 
values contrary to actions expected in economic life, which inevit- 
ably fosters further cynicism. 
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Much the same sort of analysis could also apply to the political 
dimensions of the alleged "socialist system", which might also be 
thought to require modification to remove ihcompatibility with 
development of productive forces. Certainly, arguments for political 
reform routinely emphasize the need for facilitating economic 
reform. But here the logic of the "initial stage" formulation has not 
been followed, Much more striking has been the Party's unwil- 
lingness to countenance some forms of change in political struc- 
tures, In contrast to the treatment of other supposed defining 
characteristics, therefore, the general pressure for subordination to 
economic growth has been resisted. In particular, the dominance of 
the CCP itself has been strongly affirmed, so that "Party leadership" 
has come to be seen as the key to identification of a socialist system. 
The best illustration of that position was, of course, the political 
suppression of 1989. The Central authorities demonstrated clearly 
a refusal to countenance any form of political activity asserting 
autonomy from CCP control. The suppression was explained as 
defence of socialism, which should be understood as protecting the 
role of the CCP as the single most important identified characteristic 
of the socialist system. 
Such assertion of the need for "Party leadership" is, however, a 
response to the weakness of the Party's political position rather than 
a sign of confidence. The weakness results hiom both the economis- 
tic interpretation of socialism and the lack of other substantial 
content in the understanding of "socialist system". Emphasis on 
economic growth as the overarching objective according to which 
all else must be measured implicitly challenges the Party's political 
dominance. This can be seen as a matter oi areas of competence. 
The principal justification of "Party leadership" has always been its 
claimed ability to guide processes of social transformation consistent 
with socialist objectives. That claim now appears empty. There are 
organizations other than the Party, and people other than Party 
members and cadres, more directly concerned with and competent 
in realizing the objectives of economic growth which are presented 
as central to "socialism". Hence, alternative grounds for leadership 
are suggested by the Party's own interpretations. 
Insistence that the dominant role of the Party is essential to the 
socialist system has the comforting aura of familiarity, as it is 
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I consistent with the understanding of a socialist system which has 
I long prevailed in other countries and, with the limited exception of 
I the Cultural Revolution, in China itself. But in former times the 
I 
, notion of socialist system has always had much more substantial 
I 
content. There were many characteristics which could be positively 
identified as components of the system. Under the CCP's current 
I economistic interpretation most such characteristics have been, at 
I the very least, considerably attenuated. The Party's political 
dominance, therefore, does not now appear as justified in terms of 
1 
I facilitating or protecting or supporting other parts of the system. On 
the contrary, as the only clearly identifiable characteristic of the 
I system, claims for Party leadership now appear as nothing more 
than self-serving assertion, as the Party seeking to protect its 
position for its own sake and without more general justification. 
Conclusion 
Hence, the main trends in the interpretation of socialism, while 
generally mutually reinforcing, are also contradictory, with the 
assertion of CCP dominance at the same time as the basis for that 
dominance is undermined. One motivation in the post-Mao re- 
formulation of "socialism" was to overcome the ideological con- 
fusion which impinged directly upon the justification of the Party's 
role. The "continuous revolution" approach had undermined the 
former confident assertions of "Party leadership", and had sup- 
ported the mass attacks upon, and consequent weakening of, the 
Party during the Cultural Revolution. The denial of class struggle 
and the stress on economic growth had been partially intended to 
overcome such difficulties. But the ironical result has been that the 
weakening of the Party has now been extended. 
One response to that has been a more "technocratic" orientation 
of the Party in order to assert its credentials for fostering moder- 
nisation. This has been reflected in the treatment of personnel 
issues, with emphasis on recruitment or cooptation of people with 
higher levels of expertise, especially in responsible positions within 
Party organizations. There have also emerged new general ar- 
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guments which might be adapted as justification of Party domi- 
nance within the present system - such as the theories of "new 
conservatism" and "neoa~thoritarianism".~ Such arguments are 
interesting because they are outside the framework of Marxism- 
Leninism, In particular, arguments for "neo-authoritarianism" drew 
on the experiences of non-socialist systems (such as the "Four Small 
Dragons"), cited non-Marxist-Leninist sources (including American 
and Western European academics) and often were framed in terms 
of the need to remove the constraints of what used to be regarded 
as "socialist" economic principles. They therefore demonstrate how 
far the significance of "socialism" has diminished, at least in these 
intellectual circles (who often have links to major CCP figures), to 
the extent that it has become irrelevant except as an obstacle to be 
overcome. The implications for the CCP are thus two-edged, 
Arguments for the need to maintain authoritarian controls may be 
thought useful to bolster the present system of Party dominance, 
but they provide no intrinsic justification of the Party specifically 
performing this role. Indeed, to the extent that the CCP maintains 
any residual commitment to "socialism", other sources of "neo- 
authoritarianism" may be regarded as more effective. 
Official responses to events of mid-1989 also reveal sensitivity to 
effects of the treatment of "socialism" over the preceding decade. 
Zhao Ziyang was accused of saying that no-one can state clearly 
what the socialist road is, and that of the four cardinal principles it 
was necessary to pay attention only to the principle of Party 
leader~hip.~ As an example of the common tactic of blaming a 
disgraced individual for collective faults, such criticism seems to be 
part of a general recognition of the need to give greater substance 
to the notion of socialism. Official sources have re-emphasized old 
themes, such as the necessary victory of socialism as a supposed 
law of social development (according to which the recent events in 
Europe are only a temporary setback). And that is reinforced by the 
claim that the past century of Chinese history proves that only 
socialism could have and, therefore, can "save" China, seeking to 
appeal to nationalist sentiment by presenting socialism and 
patriotism as essentially equivalent. Similarly, the official treatment 
of human rights issues asserts that socialism has provided the 
necessary basis for the realization of genuine human rights in China, 
48 Copenhagen Papers 7 -92 
Contemporary "Socialism" and the Chinese Communist Party 
II 
I Another theme is that only socialism can "develop" China - 
I which, again, has been hailed as a "new thesis" advanced by Deng 
Xiaoping." It is claimed that socialism has been necessary to avoid 
1 Chinese dependence on world capitalism, and also to prevent I 
I drawbacks of internal growth such as class polarization. This type 
I 
of argument does suggest a content for socialism apart from 
reduction to economic growth. That was also evident in the "twelve 
principles for building socialism with Chinese characteristics" 
formulated by the 7th Plenum of the 13th Central Committee at the 
end of 1990. As Jiang Zemin explained in discussing these prin- 
I 
ciples, the economic, political and cultural dimensions of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics were "an organically unified, in- 
separable whole"." 
Nevertheless, Jiang quickly added that economic construction had 
to remain the centre, to which all else was subordinated. The 
attempts to spell out objectives of social transformation, if only in 
very generalized and rhetorical terms, still necessarily confront the 
entrenched emphasis on economic growth almost irrespective of 
social consequences. That confrontation has produced further 
tensions in the Party leadership, especially in the wake of events in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. One response has been to 
revive warnings about the dangers to socialism in China. In the 
terms of the "initial stage" formulation, there has been a tendency 
to put greater emphasis on the necessary defining characteristics of 
a "socialist system1'. That has reinforced the insistence on the Party's 
political dominance, the decline in which has been seen as the chief 
cause for the downfall of socialist regimes. But there have also been 
more general warnings about the dangers of "peaceful evolution", 
and questions as to whether Chinese reforms have "practised 
socialism or capitalism". This suggests a challenge to the economis- 
tic interpretation of socialism - a challenge which has been met 
recently by condemnation of a resurgence of "leftism" and a re- 
affirmation of "one centre (economic construction)". While all CCP 
authorities may support the generalized affirmations of the 
historical necessity and progressive character of socialism, there are 
many grounds for conflict over the more precise contents of 
"socialism with Chinese characteristics." 
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